The End Entity Certificates (EECs) 
security and efficiency. In section 4, the use of MEECRM will be discussed in detail. In section 5, there will be our analysis about the security concerns of our system and it will be discussed in detail. Finally, in section 6, we will draw our conclusion of the MEECRM and discuss about our further work.
Related work
The oldest and most widely used revocation method is to publish a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [5] . CRL is generated periodically. A CRL is composed of a CA-signed list with all the serial numbers of the revoked certificates that are revoked before their expiration. The relying party needs to fetch the whole CRL from a repository to check whether a certificate is in the latest CRL. However, CRLs can tend to grow into unmanageable sizes with time growing and bring severe bandwidth requirements and transmission costs inevitablely. Besides, the updates of CRLs are not real time scheme, and the long intervals between CRL distributions often result in stale revocation information ("time granularity problem"). All of these may bring serious security problem to the whole virtual organization.
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [8] is another approach that a CA answers a query about a certificate C by returning its own digital signature of C's validity status at the current time. However OCSP is problematic in bandwidth and computation because each validity proof must be combined with CA's digital signature.
Micali [9] has proposed NOVOMODO to use one-way hash function to transmit the certificate status in a short value. The CA, at the time of issuing a certificate to the user, generates two random 20-byte values X and Y. CA uses a one-way hash function to operate on these values. The result of several-times hash operation on X is called validation target, and the result of one-time hash operation on Y is called revocation target. CA transmits relevant target to the relying party to release the current status of a certificate. Sushan [10] has implemented NOVOMODO into MyProxy to revoke the invalid PC in grid.
Boneh [6] has proposed Semi-trusted Mediator (SEM) with mediated RSA (mRSA) cryptosystem to realize fine-grained control over security capabilities. MRSA is a simple threshold variant of RSA public key cryptosystem. The CA, at the time of issuing a certificate for the user, splits the relevant decryption or signature operation. Our contribution is to provide a new EEC revocation mechanism in grid: mRSA-based End Entity Certificates Revocation Mechanism (MEECRM). MEECRM can be combined with MyProxy to revoke the invalid EECs on the base of Sushan's work [10] . In HMAC [11] , the hardware tokens are made with unique serial number, capacity of on-board HMAC computations and capacity to keep some hidden parameters (HMAC secret keys) inside the token which must not be known to outside world, except known the party who need to authenticate a message or an user. Usage of HMAC capable token can be made in user authentication. The only way to be authenticated is to own the legitimate token as well as the client's password. Thus, attackers only with the legitimate token or the client's password can't undermine the system. Berry Schoenmakers [12] , developed a publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme which is a verifiable secret sharing scheme with the property that the validity of the shares distributed by the dealer can be verified by any part. Hence verification is not limited to the respective participants receiving the shares. After introducing this development into our gird system, our system can achieve securer schemes when tying to verify users.
There should be an effective mechanism easily to be used and solve "key escrow" problem. Furthermore, after a careful analysis of these mechanisms, we find they are ways to increase the security or efficiency of some specific parts during the Certificates Revocation interactions. In other words, some of these works could be integrated together and form a new system as a whole, improving both security and efficiency, in grid.
MEECRM
In MEECRM, we join a layer of SEM function module under MyProxy. SEM is a semi-trusted third party. Its main function is helping the valid grid users to accomplish decryption and signature operations, and these operations would be used in the process of mutual authentication and issuing PCs in grid; checking whether users' EECs have been revoked. When a user U wants to access grid services, SEM checks current status of the user's EEC. Only if the user is valid, SEM would correspond with U to accomplish relevant operations. Without the help of SEM, U cannot complete decryption or signature operation independently, in other words, U cannot visit grid services successfully. Suppose U discovers his own private key part U d is compromised, which makes him feel that he must revoke his EEC at once. In this situation, MyProxy informs SEM (or SEMs in multi-SEMs support scenario) to stop helping the invalid user who uses U's EEC to visit grid services immediately. Thereby the invalid user can not visit grid services with U's compromised EEC. In other words, U's compromised EEC has been revoked already. From the process of revocation of U's EEC, we see that MEECRM could revoke invalid EEC efficiently without adding too much corresponding overhead compared with CRL in grid. And it is secure without the drawback of "time granularity problem". In addition, MyProxy only holds a part of the private key successfully, they cannot visit grid services without the cooperation of users. Naturally they cannot bring any significant threats to the whole virtual organization. So MEECRM also solves the "key escrow" problem. (1) U initiates an application of joining in grid organization to CA. (6) MPS transmits the results of response to U. In a typical scenario, U requests MPS to sign a new PC to visit grid services, and then MPS would transmit a new PC to U.
Interaction of MEECRM
(7) U visits secure grid services using PC or does relevant work using MPS's response. Now U wants to store his long-term credentials into MPS's credential repository via "myproxystore" command. In current grid environments: U's EEC C and the whole private key d will be stored; but in MEECRM: only C is stored into credential repository, and private key part 
Deployment of SEM
SEM is introduced into MEECRM to help users accomplish relevant operation. The number of SEM depends on the number of users the MPS manages and the quantum of traffic in the grid. In a typical scenario, one MPS manages all the long-term credentials in the grid, and a couple of SEMs can carry out all the requests from grid users in such grid environments. SEM1 answers the requests of decryption operation while SEM2 answers the requests of signature operation. Both of the SEMs maintain the same Certificate Revocation Form (CRF) by themselves. CRF stores the information of the revoked EECs.
Both of the SEMs should update their own CRF when a user executes "myproxy-destroy" command. If grid security administrator discovers disaccord between the two CRFs, which imply that one of the SEM may have been attacked. Attackers may have tampered the CRF. Grid security administrator can recover the form via logs.
The identity of a SEM can be certified by the respective CA. Thus a SEM can authenticate itself to a grid entity using traditional certificate-based handshake approach.
Extension deployment of multi-SEM support
In this section, we first describe a Multi-SEM support which offers a way to avoid single point failure. Then a deployment of publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme will be described.
The section above has discussed a simple deployment of muti-SEM support and it reduces the work load of SEM compared to single SEM deployment. However, Boneh [6] has proposed a Multi-SEM Support which offers a way of obtaining service from any of a set of SEMs and avoid a single point of failure of SEM and which would also be adopted to MEECRM.
Before going to introduce the interaction with multi-SEM support, there would be a slight change, when CA generates SEM d . The mRSA key generation algorithm is shown in Figure 2 . The (1)，(6)， (7) steps are the same with 3.1 And the differences are discussed below. 
Deployment with PVSS
Next, the Multi-SEM support scenario make it possible that we introduce a publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme, which enable the system with a reconstruction protocol in which the secret key is recovered by pooling the shares of a qualified subset of the participants and resist malicious SEM sever to recover the Both 3.1 and 3.3, we described that CA generates and transports the SEM d keys which serve a grid user U to MPS via secure channel. However In PVSS, there is no need for that secure channel between CA and those SEMs. All communication is done over public channels using public key encryption. Consequently, the secret will only be hidden computationally.
In this scheme, CA wishes to distribute shares of a secret values SEM d among n participants SEM1, . . . , SEMn. A monotone access structure describes which subsets of participants are qualified to recover the secret. For example, the access structure may be a (t, n)-threshold schemes, 1 <t< n, which means that any subset of t or more participants will be able to recover the secret; any smaller subset will be unable to gain any information about the secret, unless a computational assumption is broken.
As a common structure for PVSS schemes we consider the following protocols. Note that initialization is done without any interaction between the CA and the SEMs. In fact, SEMs may join or leave the system dynamically; the only requirement is that a SEM holds a registered public key.
Initialization
All system parameters are generated as part of the initialization. Furthermore, each participant SEMi registers a public key to be used with a public key encryption method Ei. The actual set of participants taking part in a run of the PVSS scheme must be a subset of the registered participants.
Distribution
The protocol consists of two steps: (1) Distribution of the shares. The distribution of a secret value ) is a correct encryption of a share for SEMi. Since anyone may verify a share, it may be ruled out that a participant complains while it does not received a correct share. In case one or more verifications fail, we therefore say that the dealer fails, and the protocol is aborted.
Reconstruction
The protocol consists of two steps: would not be known to outside world unless pooling t parts or more together. We described two different extensions, in this section, to protect the SEM servers, because the sever side is more likely to suffer from malicious attacks. One extension is part 3.3 in which provide an mRSA key generation algorithm for multiple SEMs, and the other is part 3.4 deployment with PVSS. In part 3.3, it is better for a CA to transmit the SEM d key in security channel, however, in PVSS, all communication is done though public channels using public key encryption method. In this way, extension with PVSS would more likely to be adopted widely. However, noted that when CA splits relevant private key into 
Deployment of HMAC capable token in user authentication
Here we describe MEECRM using a HMAC capable token in user authentication or public key infrastructure (PKI) to derive user private key or produce message digest for digital signature scheme. The unique hardware token will be linked together with the user password cryptographically to provide a more secure/stronger solution, especially to provide protection against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on a SEM.
First of all, TA must first select a random generated master identity secret (for identification purpose), denoted as Sidentity, which must also be known by the SEM server which need to authenticate a user or incoming message.
TA generated the token the hardware tokens with unique serial number i, capacity of on-board HMAC computations and capacity to keep some hidden parameters (HMAC secret keys) inside. And the token can be in any hardware which can plug in or connect to PC, with USB port, for example.
The token can be owned by authenticated users or hardware resources in grid infrastructure such as PCs. Here we regard HMAC(a , b) as applying HMAC using "a" as the key and "b" is the data we want to compute the digest. So, TA need to compute Kidentification = HMAC(Sidentity , i ) and then insert this key in to the token. This is the secret key keep inside the token which should not be known to outside. Since only TA and authentication SEM server know about Sidentity and always be able to compute HMAC(Sidentity , i ), which means server can authenticate any message (M) received from client consist of digest HMAC(Kidentification , M ).
When registering a user, we must let user choose an authentication password (P). Then the SEM server need to record user's ID (or name), corresponding token serial number and his password in database, and the password must be saved in encrypted form.
The SEM server can send a random generated challenge value (RC) to the client, then the client will have to response by compute u = HMAC(Kidentification, RC) using the token and then compute Rclient =HMAC( P, u ). Rclient is the response value which the client has to send back to server for verification. At the server side, it must know which user is trying to login, then it will retrieve the required parameters from the database (i.e. the user specific token serial number and password), and compute the correct response value Rserver locally (since server know about the master identity secret). Then, server can compare Rclient with Rserver to determine if the user is a legitimate user and own the corresponding legitimate token. By imposing the HMAC capable token in an innovative way, an attacker with only either a stolen token or just knowing the user password is not enough to compromise the system. He cannot compute a correct response value without both of the components.
Use of MEECRM
Application of MEECRM mainly consists of mutual authentication, mutual message exchange method, revocation of EECs and issuing PCs. 
Mutual authentication protocol

Mutual message exchange method
Similar to mutual authentication protocol, we now suppose that user U wants to exchange a private message with a resource provider R.
(1) U fetches R's public key R PK through online requests.
(2) When U considering encrypting his message using the fetched public key R PK , he separates the whole message into two parts: (i) a short preamble containing a per-message key encrypted with R's public key, and (ii) the body containing the actual private message encrypted using the per-message key.
(3) Then the whole message is sent to R. (4) To decrypt the message from U, R sends preamble to it SEM. SEM decrypts the preamble using R's SEM d and transmits the result to R.
(5) R decrypts the preamble with the help of SEM, and then R fetches the per-message key now. (6) R completes the decryption of the body part using the per-message key and, ultimately, to get the actual private message. Figure 5 . Revocation of EECs Figure 5 shows how to revoke invalid EECs in MEECRM. Suppose grid user U discovers his EEC C is compromised. U revokes C via "myproxy-destroy" command and the MPS changes s C ' status into invalid. At the same time, MPS informs SEM that C has been revoked. SEM puts the information of C into his own CRF. From now on, SEM refuses to cooperate with the user who wants to visit grid services with C. In other words, malicious users can not visit grid services although they may have invalid C and relevant U d . Now C has been revoked without too much corresponding overhead. 
Revocation of EECs
Update of EECs
Issuing PC
Grid user U could submit an application of issuing a new PC via "myproxy-get-delegation" command. U encrypts message m with 
Security analysis
We focus on the security problems in the process of issuing a new PC and mutual authentication. There are several security concerns:
(1) CA is free from attacks which intend to compromise the key pair generated after user initiates an application of joining in grid organization.
(2) The user can not generate signatures or decrypt any cryptograph after being revoked in MEECRM.
(3) Introducing timestamp in the mutual authentication protocol can avoid replay attack. (6) An alternative deployment with PVSS and its security concerns. (7) MEECRM makes use of HMAC in user authentication or public key infrastructure (PKI). There will be discussions about the security concerns in more details, just as follows.
Security concerns on CA
CA, serving as a trusted entity and issuing key-pair, is an idea target for any attacker who wants to compromise the system. However, it is useless for malicious attackers to try to get the key-pair generated after users' initiation. Note that, in traditional CRL mechanism, CA has to keep the revocation list and leave the potential opportunity for attacker to forge the list behind. In our system, a CA only generates client's keys and does not need to keep them. In fact, a CA distributes the key-pair to the user and the relevant SEM immediately after the pair being generated. CA must erase them to assure that any successful future attack on the CA does not result in client's keys being compromised.
Security concerns by adopting mRSA
Each corresponding message has been encrypted by the other's public key during the process. Boneh [6] has proved that the user cannot do relevant operation after being revoked in mRSA cryptosystem because of lacking the half key SEM d on SEM server. And a malicious user who is trying to forge a conversation message on the behavior of U or SEM cannot succeed due to the security of mRSA cryptosystem in which no one can forge
on himself. Besides SEM or U would not be able to accomplish decryption or signature operation independently which has also been proved impossible in theory by Boneh [6] . So the conversation between the grid entities is confidential.
Security concerns by introducing timestamp to provide timeliness service
During the process of authentication, each message is combined with the current timestamp which has been introduced in the mutual authentication protocol in 4.1. Message recipients only accept the message which is timely they think. So the protocol can fight against replay attacks.
Mutual authentication protocol provides protection against attacking to private Messages
We recall that public key-encrypted message is usually composed of two parts: (1) a short preamble containing a per-message key encrypted with public key, and (2) the body containing the actual private message encrypted using the per-message key.
Soon after someone sends a message to the Resource Provider (RP) in this system, for example, A user called Wood sends a message m to the RP, RP just need to sends the preamble part to its SEM and SEM responses with a token which enables RP to complete the decryption of the per-message key and, ultimately, to read Wood's message. However, this token contains no information useful to anyone other than Wood. Hence, communication with the SEM does not need to be secret or authenticated.
Multi-SEM supporting provides protection against single point failure
As we know, each SEM serves many clients, a SEM failure -whether due to hostile attacks or accidental causes -stops all of its clients from decrypting data and generating signatures. To avoid such failure, mRSA can be modified to allow a single client to use multiple SEMs. We could either simply replicate a SEM to avoid accidental (non-malicious) failures, though this method cannot prevent from hostile attacks, or we could allow a client to be served by multiple SEMs, each with a different mRSA setting. The different mRSA method would require the CA to run the mRSA key generation algorithm t times (if t is the number of SEMs) for each client , obviously it is complicated. Our approach allows a SEM client to have a single public key and a single certificate while offering the flexibility of obtaining service from any of a set of SEMs. At the same time, each SEM maintains a different mRSA half-key for a given client. Thus, if any number of SEMs(who support a given client) collude, they are unable to impersonate that client, i.e., unable to compute the client's half-key.
Advantage of deployment with PVSS
There are two main advantages adopting PVSS. Firstly, it is unnecessary to build a security channel between CA and the relevant SEM servers, which obviously reduces the cost of the system. Secondly, directly breaking the encryptions used in our PVSS scheme implies breaking the Diffie-Hellman assumption which has been proved infeasible in [12] .
The special PVSS scheme is secure in the random oracle model. That is, (1) the reconstruction protocol results in the secret distributed by the dealer for any qualified set of participants, (2) any non-qualified set of participants is not able to recover the secret.
HMAC provide protection against DoS attacks
We adopt HMAC in user authentication or public key infrastructure. In our approach, we adopted HMAC to authenticate client requests. In this way to provide protection against denialof-service (DoS) attacks on a SEM. As discussed in section 3, this would require a shared secret key between a SEM and each client. A CA could help in the generation and distribution of such shared secrets at the time of mRSA key generation. Yet another alternative is to rely on more general encapsulation techniques, such as SSL, to provide a secure channel for communication between SEMs and clients. An attacker with only either a stolen token or just knowing the user password is not enough to compromise the system. He cannot compute a correct response value without both of the hardware token and the user's password.
From the discussion above, it shows that our security concerns cover every parts of the system among them are the trust entity CA, the user in grid, the MPS sever and the SEM servers. Firstly, CA is carefree because nobody can compromise the key-part generated by it. Secondly, the confidential information transmitted between users and SEMs is protected by mRSA cryptosystem and the preamble part which encrypted with public key. Thirdly, there are alternative choices to protect the SEM side such as Multi-SEM support and deployment with PVSS. At last, HMAC has been introduced to authenticate client requests and protect against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on a SEM.
Conclusions
We form a new approach from retrieving credential to visit grid services to revocation of such credential by mainly combining MyProxy, NOVOMODO, SEM function module, PVSS and HMAC. We now achieve simplified validation of digital signatures, efficient credential revocation for grid systems and fast revocation of signature and decryption capabilities. At the same time, we reduce the complex certificate management and the workload when computing signature. We also provide alternative ways to extend the system, depending on the security level. So MEECRM is an efficient and secure mechanism to revoke the invalid EECs in grid environment.
Up to now, the research on MEECRM remains in theory. In future work, we will consummate MEECRM and do relevant experiment testing to improve the performance of MEECRM.
